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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Appellants, David and Linda Johannessen, appeal from the trial court's decision 
dismissing their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The decision voids an agreement between Appellants and Appellee to 
lower a monthly assessment fee on Appellants' condominium unit. Appellee, Canyon Road 
Towers Owners Association, had authority to enter into a contractual agreement and did in fact 
enter into a valid and enforceable contractual agreement, supported by sufficient consideration, 
with Appellants. Because Appellants relied upon this agreement to their detriment and because 
Appellee knew of this reliance and the material facts surrounding the agreement, the contract is 
enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Additionally, even if Appellee lacked 
authority to enter into this contract on behalf of the non-profit corporation which it represents 
arguably making the act ultra vires, the agreement is still enforceable because it was entered into 
in good faith without knowledge of the possible lack of corporate authorization. The trial court's 
decision also incorrectly strikes certain paragraphs of Appellant David Johannessen's Affidavit 
in Support of Summary Judgment. This appeal follows. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court having transferred this case, the Utah Court Of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE 
May a homebuyer enforce an agreement, entered into in conjunction with the purchase of 
a unit, with the Management Committee of a Homeowner's Association that effectively lowered 
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the monthly assessment contrary to the Condominium Association's Declaration, when the 
homebuyer relied upon said agreement in purchasing the unit? 
This issue presents a question of law. An appellate court reviews the trial court's 
application of law de novo. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE TWO 
May an incorporated homeowners association avoid the contracts entered into through 
their management committee upon the grounds that said committee lacked authority to enter into 
such contracts, despite the limitation of ultra vires defenses contained in Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-
23? 
This issue presents a question of law. Therefore, the standard of review of the trial 
court's application of law is de novo. Id. 
ISSUE THREE 
Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in striking paragraph 11 of Appellant David 
Johannessen's affidavit upon the grounds that it was not based upon personal knowledge and 
made legal conclusions, striking paragraphs 13 and 14 upon the grounds that they are conclusory, 
and striking paragraph 16 for lack of appropriate foundation? 
This issue presents questions of fact. An appellate court reviews a trial court's findings 
of fact using the clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion standard. Id.; Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 
P.2d 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
DETERMANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-23 provides as follows: 
No act of nonprofit corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal 
property to or by such a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact that the 
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corporation was without capacity or power to do such act or to make or receive 
such conveyance or transfer, but such lack of capacity or power may be asserted: 
(1) In a proceeding by a member or trustee against the corporation to 
enjoin the doing or continuation of unauthorized acts, or the transfer of real or 
personal by or to the corporation. If the authorized acts or transfers sought to be 
enjoined are being, or are to be, performed pursuant to any contract to which the 
corporation is a party, the court may, if all of the parties to the contract are parties 
to the proceeding and if it deems the same equitable, set aside and enjoin the 
performance of such contract,, and in so doing may allow to the corporation or the 
other parties to the contract, as the case may be, compensation for the loss or 
damage sustained by either of them which may result from the action of the court 
setting aside and enjoining the performance of such contract, but anticipated 
profits to be derived from the performance of the contract shall not be awarded by 
the court as a loss or damage sustained. 
(2) In a proceeding by the corporation, whether acting directly or through 
a receiver, trustee, or other legal representative, or through members in a 
representative suit against the incumbent or former officers or trustees of the 
corporation for exceeding their authority. 
(3) In a proceeding by the attorney general, as provided in this act, to 
dissolve the corporation, or in a proceeding by the attorney general to enjoin the 
corporation from performing unauthorized acts, or in any other proceeding by the 
attorney general. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides as follows: 
Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or 
served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion 
for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Assessment Fee 
Appellants are the owners of unit P9, a condominium unit contained within the Canyon 
Road Towers, as the same is recorded in the Record of Survey Map in Salt Lake County, Utah, 
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on March 1 6 , 1 9 7 6 , as Entry 7794953 , Plat Book N o . 76-3-53 , subject to the 
Du ' la r j i I-- II ..r Condominium recorded currently therewith. (Johannessen A11 ] "i' K M I'M I 
Historically unit P9 w a s a unique uml , h , «i .msi* iho "Jucs assessed were significantly 
J11 gl ici 111.111 1 1 1 1 • t 111111" i f the same combined size within the condominium, including the 
combined assessment of the two units directly I •!" iiia ill ii, -!'/</. 111114-5, I J, R al 105-6), The 
dues associated ucn under applicable Utah Condomin ium L a w would normally 
be that uni t ' s percentage of the undivided ownership interest i "h >"'i""i<"i piojocl, were 
abnormally h igh due i the developers in assigning interests to uni ts wi thin 
yon Road Towers . ( M a t f f 4 -5 ; R. at 105) For this reason, h is tum ,ill\ ih« -^ HITS of unit 
P9 had not paid ttie full dues acquisition b y Appel lants . In fact, unit P9 , prior 
'•« \ | »("H 1 Lulls' purchase w a s in foreclosure and absolutely no dues were beiiJL «. 
unit. (Id at If 6; R. at 105; Seely Aii 1 \ I., ,u 11 i 
\ppci(;i"l became aware of the unreasonably high assessment in negotiat e 
purchase of unit P9 . (Johannessen Ail cpress condi t ion for purchasing 
the unit, A J >| K 11 a I I I • «"- • -1 ( 11 red that the issue of the abnormally high fee b e resolved prior to 
closing. (IcL at Iflf 8-9; R. at 105; Seely Aff. *| : if the board recognized a 
distinct benefit i it -n eniig tin issessment and encouraging sale of the unit unders tanding that 
the association would benefit if the unit were sold to a good ilut ,\ |M V my, m u n h u , as the dues 
were currently in arreai s i Nn "I v A11 1| / K at 252; see also Johannessen Aff. Ex. A - B ; R. at 
108-09) Appel lants ' and the Board of Directors of" the t a n \ on koii. i 1 nwers ( H U R T S 
Associat ion entered into an agreement to 'reduce the assessment on uni t P 9 to $416 monthly . 
(Joli.miu:sscn All" H 12; R. at 106; see also Weyher Aff f *• P - + C . .. .. • .--
4 
purchased unit P9 in reliance upon the agreement of the board to reduce that unit's assessment. 
(Johannessen Aff. f 9; R. at 105; Seely Aff. % 9; R. at 253). 
In connection with the closing on the unit, the monthly dues were represented to be $416, 
as agreed upon. Appellants and the board of directors arrived at this figure by adding the total 
monthly dues for the two units directly underneath unit P9 for a number of floors, which when 
combined have the same square footage as unit P9, and then reducing that figure by one 
maintenance fee and one reserve fee resulting from the combination of the two unit's 
assessments. (Johannessen Aff. f 12; R. at 106; Seely Aff. fflf 6,8; R. at 252). 
At the closing, Appellants' closing agent was again quoted the figure of $416 per month 
as an assessment fee. (Johannessen Aff. ^ 13; R. at 106). This figure became the basis for the 
original proration upon closing. Subsequently, Appellants were billed the sum of $416 per 
month for a number of years. (IcL_ at f 13; R. at 106; see also Seeley Aff. f 10; R. at 253). Over 
time Appellant's assessment increased proportionally based upon the initial figure of $416 when 
all dues were raised. (Johannessen Aff. f 13; R. at 106). 
Repudiation of the Agreement 
In 1996 the board of directors, consisting of new members, reviewed Appellants' 
assessment. After review, the board repudiated the prior agreement entered into with Appellants 
lowering their monthly assessment. (Johannessen Aff f^ 14; R. at 106; see also Weyher Aff. f 5; 
R. at 12). The board is now requiring an assessment of $753.00 per month on the unit. (Weight 
Aff. 15 ; R. at 134). 
The Affidavit of David Johannessen 
Appellants, in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed the affidavit of 
Appellant David Johannessen which states as follows: 
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11 The Board agreed that the assessment was unfair and that the only way to 
resolve it would be to effectively reduce the assessment of the Unit. Then the 
Board of Directors of the Canyon Road Towers Owners Association entered into 
an agreement evidenced by the Minutes, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B, to permanently reduce the assessment 
13. At the closing my agent was quoted the figure of $416 per month which 
became the basis for the original proration at closing. Subsequently, I was billed 
the sum of $416 for a number of years, affirming the original agreement, except 
that dues were increased proportionally when the entire dues were raised from 
time to time. 
14. At a certain point in time in 1996 a new Board decided to review this decision 
and has since attempted to rescind this 
16 In the past, Defendant has purchased a unit and certain parking spaces and 
converted the same to use as a common area. In connection with those 
acquisitions the Board did not seek to reallocate undivided interest percentages 
among the owners. In effect the association subsidizes, or pays, these dues, that 
formerly were paid by the owners. Therefore, I believe this corporate decision is 
similar to what occurred in my case. 
Uoluiiiicssen All T|( li II ll 10, R. at 106-07) ' , • 
The Decisions Below 
l\ Ink* spivilu .ilk .H'kii-ii-vi Itxlgnii; that a contract had formed between Appellants and 
Appellee and that Appellants had detrimentally relied upon the contract (OuU:r 1 inintiiig Stiitirn. 
I HI hivot ol Uel, H A, K «ii in '"! Hi.1 I .1 - .i il denied Appellants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and granted Appellee's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment w huh dismissal -ill -I 
Appellants' claims against Appdit granted Appellee's Motion to Strike with 
regard to paragraphs 11,1.?.;* and 1(> of Appellant's Affidavit in Support of Summary 
Judgment. (Id at t f 1-2; R. at : * 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellee, Canyon Road Towers Owners Association, entered into a valid and enforceable 
contract with Appellants to lower the monthly assessment on unit P9. This agreement was 
supported by sufficient consideration. Appellee is granted the power to enter into such 
agreements by virtue of the governing Declaration of Condominium. {See Declaration of 
Condominium of Canyon Road Towers f 12; R. at 25-27). Appellee has exercised similar 
powers in the past and was again acting in the best interest of the condominium community as a 
whole. Therefore, the contract existing between the parties should be enforced, and Appellants' 
lowered assessment should continue. 
The undisputed facts, as evidenced by the trial court's ruling, indicated that an agreement 
to lower the assessment was agreed to and made by Appellee at the time of purchase, that 
Appellee knew all the material facts associated with the agreement, that Appellants, as found by 
the trial court, clearly relied upon the promise to their detriment, and that it was foreseeable and 
reasonable that Appellants would rely on such a promise and purchase the unit. (Transcript P26, 
R. at 361). Consequently, the original promise to lower the assessment should be enforced under 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Appellee argued to the trial court that the agreement between Appellant and Appellee to 
lower the monthly assessment is void because it is ultra vires. However, an act of a non-profit 
corporation is not invalid solely because it is ultra vires. As found by the trial court, Appellants 
contracted with Appellee corporation in good faith, believing that Appellee had authority to 
lower the assessment on the unit and relied upon the contract to their detriment. (Transcript P26, 
R. at 361). Regardless of whether Appellee had said authority, it cannot now avoid its 
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contractual responsibility merely because its entity lacked corporate authority to so contract. 
Because of the detrimental reliance by Appellants, equity requires enforcement of the contract. 
Finally, the trial court erred in striking portions of Appellant David Johannessen's 
Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment. The omitted portions of Appellant's affidavit were 
based on personal knowledge, did not make legal conclusions, and maintained appropriate 
foundation to be admissible under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e). As a result, Appellant's 
Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment should be admissible in its entirety. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CANYON ROAD TOWERS OWNERS ASSOCIATION ENTERED INTO A 
VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT WITH APPELLANTS THAT 
APPELLANTS DETRIMENTALLY RELIED UPON, AND, THEREFORE, 
CANYON ROAD TOWERS IS ESTOPPED FROM BREACHING THE 
CONTRACT. 
A. Canyon Road Towers Entered Into A Valid And Enforceable Contract 
With Appellants. 
Appellee, Canyon Road Towers Owners Association entered into a valid and enforceable 
contract with Appellants. Appellants agreed to purchase unit P9 in reliance upon Appellee's 
agreement to lower the monthly assessment upon the unit to a more reasonable figure. (R. at 26; 
Johannessen Aff. f 11; R. at 106). The consideration upon which the agreement was based 
includes Appellants' lowered assessment and Appellee gaining the benefit of a consistent and 
longstanding dues-paying owner. Appellee is granted the power to enter into such agreements 
by virtue of the governing Declaration of Condominium (Declaration of Condominium 112; R. 
at 25-27) and has exercised similar powers in the past. (Johannessen Aff. f 16; R. at 106-107). 
For these reasons, the contract existing between the parties should be enforced, and Appellants' 
lowered assessment should continue. 
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To form a valid contract there must be mutual assent between two or more persons 
competent to contract, based upon sufficient consideration, to perform an act or omit to do 
something. 17A Am. Jur. Contracts 16. To determine if parties entered into an enforceable 
contract, a court should consider all preliminary negotiations, offers, and counter offers and 
interpret the various expressions of the parties for the purpose of deciding whether the parties 
reached agreement on the terms. Nunlev v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1084 
(Utah 1999). In negotiating a contract, parties may impose any condition precedent, the 
performance of which is essential before they become bound by the agreement. 17A Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts 34. 
Based upon these legal requirements for the creation of a contract, Appellants' agreement 
with Appellee constitutes an enforceable contract. Appellants diligently pursued an agreement 
with Appellee to reduce the monthly assessment fee on unit P9. Appellants offered to purchase 
unit P9 upon the condition and in exchange for Appellee's promise to lower the monthly 
assessment on the unit. Appellee, recognizing that the assessment on unit P9 was unfair and 
recognizing the value of having a good and longstanding dues-paying owner, agreed to the 
subsidy. 
The parties mutually assented to the purchase of the unit with a lowered monthly dues 
assessment. The consideration upon which the agreement was based includes Appellants' 
lowered assessment and Appellee gaining the benefit of a dues-paying owner. Appellants' relied 
upon this contract and purchased unit P9 as a result. Appellants would not have purchased the 
unit in absence of this agreement. 
Appellee has the power and a duty to act in the best interest of the Association. Section 
12 of the Canyon Road Towers Declaration of Condominium grants the Management Committee 
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authority to contract and perform any other acts or enter into any other transactions that may be 
reasonably necessary for the Management Committee to perform its functions as agent of the 
unit owners. Indeed the Association's Declaration of Condominium state that any person who in 
good faith and for value relies on a written instrument (in this case the association's written 
minutes and its subsequent dealings) may conclusively rely on the power of the management 
committee to act (See Declaration of Condominium f 12(a)(9); Transcript P26, R. at 361). 
Appellee exercised this power to contract by agreeing to subsidize Appellant's assessments. 
Appellee exercised such powers on behalf of the Unit Owners and for the benefit of the 
association as a whole, recognizing that the value of having a good and longstanding dues-
paying owner substantially outweighed the subsidy of the balance of unit P9's assessment 
assumed by the condominium community as a result of the agreement. 
Appellee has exercised similar powers in the past. On one occasion, Appellee purchased 
a unit, as well as a certain parking space, and turned the property into additional common area 
without attempting to amend the undivided interests. Such a transaction, in effect, heightened 
the assessment burden upon the remaining unit owners, as there was then one less unit and 
parking space paying assessments within the condominium. The case at hand is analogous. 
Appellee recognized the benefit to the condominium community as a whole in having unit P9 
purchased by Appellants, thus stabilizing the payment of dues on this unit and correcting the 
developers' mistake of the excessively high assessment. As a practical matter, the one time that 
the association faces risk by loss on dues is when a first mortgage lender forecloses on a unit. 
This was in jeopardy of occurring in unit P9 prior to Appellants' purchase because the unit was 
in foreclosure. The association knew that unit P9 was very difficult to market because of the 
abnormally high dues. They sought a solution by subsidizing the dues to solve an ongoing 
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problem. As a result, Appellants agreed to lower the monthly assessment on unit P9, effectively 
subsidizing the difference, which, much like turning a unit into common area, caused a slight 
upward adjustment to other unit owners. 
In sum, Appellee entered into a valid and enforceable agreement that is supported by a 
sufficient consideration. Appellee is granted the power to enter into such agreements by virtue 
of the governing Declaration of Condominium. Appellee has exercised similar powers in the 
past and was again acting in the best interest of the condominium community as a whole. 
Therefore, the contract existing between the parties should be enforced, and appellant's lowered 
assessment should continue. 
B. Canyon Road Towers Induced Appellants To Purchase Unit P9 By 
Agreeing To Only Charge $416 In Monthly Assessment And Are, Therefore, 
Estopped From Breaching Their Promise. 
It is undisputed that Appellee entered into an agreement with Appellants to lower the 
assessment on their condominium in connection with Appellant's purchase of unit P9. Appellee 
merely asserts that the agreement is not enforceable. However, Appellants detrimentally relied 
upon Appellee's agreement to reduce the assessment on unit P9 upon Appellants' purchasing this 
condominium unit. For this reason, under the principal of equity, Appellee is estopped from 
breaching the agreement under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Generally, a party may be estopped fromi breaching a promise that induced another party 
to act under the theory of promissory estoppel The Utah Supreme Court defines promissory 
estoppel as "a promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance." Talboe Construction Co. v. Staker Paving & Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 
(Utah 1984) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90). In such circumstances, a promise "is 
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binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." Id, In Utah four 
elements are necessary to show promissory estoppel: 
(1) The Plaintiff acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise 
made by the Defendant; (2) the Defendant knew that the plaintiff had relied on the 
promise which the defendant should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the party of the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the Defendant was 
aware of all material facts; and (4) the Plaintiff relied on the promise and the 
reliance resulted in a loss to the Plaintiff. 
Nunlevv. Westates CasinzServices. 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). 
Appellants herein acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on Appellee's promise 
to lower the assessment on the unit they were purchasing. Appellants exercised due diligence by 
making such an accommodation part of their purchase contract. Given that the promise was 
reflected in both the purchase agreement and the Minutes for December 10,1992, of the 
Homeowners Association Board, (Johannessen Aff.;R. at 105-106) Appellants acted reasonably 
in relying upon the promise. 
Appellee clearly knew that Appellants relied upon the promise and that the promise 
would reasonably induce Appellants to purchase the subject property. The Minutes for 
December 10, 1992, of the Owners Association's Board state specifically that the Board was 
fully aware that the lowered assessment was a condition of Appellants purchasing the unit. 
(Johannessen Aff. Ex. B; R. at 109). Given the Association's agreement to lower the assessment, 
it is reasonable that they would expect Plaintiff to purchase the unit in reliance upon their 
promise. 
Appellee was fully aware of all of the material facts surrounding the agreement. The 
board minutes show that the Association considered the proposed assessment and measured it 
against other units in the development. Indeed, Appellee, as the governing body of the 
development, likely was more familiar with the material facts surrounding the agreement than 
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Appellants. The issue of the reasonableness of Appellants' reliance is buttressed by the 
Declaration of Condominium itself which hold by states that the management committee's 
writings conclusively establish the association's power to act. (Declaration of Condominium f 
12(a)(9); Transcript P26, R. at 361.) 
Finally, as specifically found by the trial court, Appellants relied upon the contract to 
their detriment. (Transcript P26, R. at 361.) Appellants relied upon the promise and purchased 
the unit only to have the promise taken away some time after the purchase. Appellants are now 
stuck paying an assessment that they did not consent to and even expressly contracted against. 
As a result, Appellants' property value is severely diminished through the stigma of an 
unreasonably high monthly assessment. 
Appellants' plight is a prime example of an injustice that can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the original promise through the theory of promissory estoppel. The undisputed 
facts indicated that an agreement to lower the assessment was made and agreed to by Appellee at 
the time of purchase, that Appellee knew all the material facts, that it was foreseeable and 
reasonable that Appellants would rely on such a promise and purchase the unit, and that 
Appellants clearly relied upon the promise to their detriment. Consequently, the promise to 
lower the assessment on unit P9 should be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
II. EVEN IF THE ASSESSMENT CONCESSION ORIGINALLY GRANTED BY 
THE CANYON ROAD TOWERS OWNERS ASSOCIATION WAS AN ULTRA 
VIRES ACT, THE CONTRACT IS ENFORCEABLE UNDER UCA § 16-6-23. 
Appellee argued to the trial court that the Board had no power to lower the dues absent 
compliance with the Utah Condominium Act. Indeed, the trial court had previously ruled that 
the remedy of ordering ongoing compliance with the agreement (as was originally prayed for in 
the complaint) violated the Condominium Act, but then the Trial Court allowed an Amended 
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Complaint to sue for damages only. When a corporation acts without any capacity, power, or 
authorization to complete an act, the act is termed ultra vires. However, an act of a non-profit 
corporation is not invalid solely because it is ultra vires. Utah Code Ann. 16-6-23. Generally, 
this statute, under the principal of equity, has been interpreted to limit the ultra vires defense and 
to lend credence to agreements where parties contracted with the corporation in good faith to 
their detriment without knowledge of the status or legality of the corporate authorization. Park 
v. Alta Ditch & Canal Co.. 458 P.2d 625, 628 (Utah 1969); Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577, 
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("the primary purpose of section 16-6-23, as evidenced by the 
section's plain language, is to eliminate a corporation's ability to avoid its obligations to third 
parties by raising a defense of ultra vires"). 
Appellants contracted with Appellee's corporation in good faith to their detriment, 
believing that Appellee had full authority to lower the assessment on unit P9. Appellee also 
acted under this belief. Regardless of whether Appellee's corporation had said authority, it 
cannot now avoid their contractual responsibility merely because it, as an entity, may have 
lacked corporate authority to so contract. Because Utah Code Ann. 16-6-23 limits the ultra vires 
defense, Appellee is bound by its agreement with Appellants regardless of whether the 
corporation lacked authority to contractually lower the assessment. 
III. APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
BASED ON PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, DOES NOT MAKE LEGAL 
CONCLUSIONS, AND IS BASED UPON APPRORIATE FOUNDATION AND IS, 
THEREFORE, ADMISSIBLE IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
Under the rules set forth in Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e), Appellant David 
Johannessen's Affidavit in Support of Summary Judgment is admissible in its entirety. Rule 
56(e) states, in relevant part: 
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Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). "An affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of a fact before the 
court." In re General Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water; Murdoch v. 
Springville, 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). As a result, affidavits, like all evidence, must be based 
upon personal knowledge, must not be conclusory, and must maintain appropriate foundation. 
Id. Appellant's Affidavit in support of Summary Judgment met these criteria. 
Appellant states in paragraph 11 that "the Board agreed that the assessment was unfair 
and that the only way to resolve it would be to effectively reduce the assessment of the unit." 
The trial court held that this paragraph was not based on personal knowledge. However, through 
hours of negotiations with the Board for purchase of unit P9, Appellant became intimately aware 
of the Board's opinions regarding the unit. These negotiations served to provide Appellant with 
sufficient grounds upon which to base his statements in paragraph 11 of his affidavit. As a 
result, paragraph 11 is based upon personal knowledge and should not have been struck from the 
record. 
The trial court struck both paragraphs 13 and 14 from Appellant's affidavit as conclusory. 
Paragraph 13 states in part that "[Appellant] was billed the sum of $416 for a number of years, 
affirming the original agreement." Paragraph 14 states that "in 1996 a new Board decided to 
review this decision and has since attempted to rescind this." The only statement within all of 
paragraph 13 that is even remotely conclusory is the line "affirming the original agreement," and 
even this statement is merely an interjection and observation regarding an agreement that 
Appellant was a party to. Likewise, paragraph 14 is not conclusory because Appellant has been 
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forced to pay an increased assessment since 1996 in direct contradiction to the initially agreed 
upon amount of $416. This constitutes a statement of fact and not a conclusion of law. 
Finally, the trial court incorrectly struck paragraph 16 of Appellant's affidavit, which 
discussed the conversion of a particular unit and parking space by the Board into common area, 
striking the paragraph for lack of appropriate foundation. However, Appellant is competent to 
testify regarding this point. Appellant is a due paying member of the association. As a member 
of the association and a resident within the building, he personally witnessed the conversion of 
the unit and parking space into common area. As a result, he is competent to testify to the fact. 
As demonstrated, the omitted portions of Appellant's affidavit were based on personal 
knowledge, did not make legal conclusions, and maintained appropriate foundation under Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e). As a result, Appellant's Affidavit in Support of Summary 
Judgment should be admissible in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's holding should be reversed and the case 
remanded to determine damages. 
DATED this / J day of. JRk^lUf , 2001. 
}\ J. Gallian 
id for 
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WELKER 
Attorney for Appellants 
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